We are back with the next set of notes on E.D. Hirsch, Jr.’s Validity in Interpretation. This chapter is on Understanding, Interpretation, and Criticism. I found it to be the least interesting as a whole. It mostly involved clarifying some terms related to interpretation.
The first section is about the diversity of interpretations. If there is a notion of valid/invalid for an interpretation, how can there be so many? Is only one correct? The answer is that we should welcome these diverse interpretations, because they all contribute to understanding. A key idea that is repeated throughout this chapter is that understanding comes before interpretation. We must understand what the author means before we can put our explanation into words.
Different interpretations can agree on the author’s meaning, in which case our understanding is deepened. Conflict only arises when two interpretations disagree on what the author means. Sometimes the difference might only be aspects of the same traits. Hirsch gives an example of two people looking at the same building from different angles. They might describe the building in radically different ways, but they are still describing the same thing.
The next two sections are where the terminology begins. I’ll distill the definitions here.
Understanding: The construction of meaning. A silent, internal affair.
Interpretation: The explanation of meaning. This almost always contains criticism and significance claims, but should be kept separate as a theoretical matter. Interpretation is an art, because the interpreter must convey their understanding accurately using terms that are familiar to their audience.
Significance: A perceived relationship between the verbal meaning and something else. We usually cannot artificially isolate significance from the above two acts, because these relationships aid us in coming to an understanding of a text.
Criticism: The explanation of significance. Thus, criticism is to significance as interpretation is to understanding.
Judgment: The act of perceiving significance. “One understands meaning; one judges significance.” This can include value judgments, but could also be purely descriptive.
Even though Hirsch is largely concerned with interpretation for the book, he emphasizes that criticism is important because it shows us why a work has value. He turns to the idea of intrinsic criticism for the next section. This starts with a brief retrospective. After the early 20th century logical positivists took hold of criticism, the literary community rebelled and tried to formulate a literary form of criticism. This was a useful advancement, but Hirsch wants to do better.
The theorists argued that the only way to properly judge a literary work is on literary grounds. For example, it is wrongheaded to judge the value of a poem on how well it would serve as a newspaper headline. The only fair way to judge a poem is in how well it succeeds as a poem. New problem: this is not a good way to judge a poem, because there is no agreed upon notion of what a poem is.
This is where intrinsic criticism comes in. We must make our judgments according to the nature of the work, but we cannot come into the work assuming we know what those standards are. We must look to the work itself to determine its nature. Judging by extrinsic criteria will be called extrinsic criticism. The theorists argue that extrinsic criticism is always wrongheaded.
Hirsch points out that it can be a useful tool sometimes. Being forced to limit yourself to intrinsic criticism is, well, limiting. The critic has a duty to judge by extrinsic criteria if she believes the purpose of the author to be misguided. For example, an essay may be extremely unclear and vague, but the arguments of the author well-known. If the intended argument is faulty, then it is reasonable to critique it. This is extrinsic, because the intended argument cannot be parsed from the poorly written essay itself.
A more concrete example is Gadamer’s famous work on interpretation Truth and Method. Gadamer wrote about how the historicity of understanding affects interpretation. Hirsch criticizes it for not concerning itself with validity. This form of extrinsic criticism is judging the assumptions on which the work was written. Hirsch believes Gadamer succeeded in his intended purpose, but that his purpose was faulty in this matter.
He ends with a plea for critical freedom. At the time this was written, the established schools of thought argued for a very limited “literary” internal criticism (*cough* New Criticism). The main point they try to make is that anyone is free to criticize a work using any method, but it is not valid to evaluate the work on the arbitrary grounds that the critic makes up. For example, one should not evaluate Paradise Lost as a poor work on the grounds that it does not contribute to the history of mathematics.
Hirsch gets around this by saying that extrinsic criticism shouldn’t be arbitrary. A good critic understands what the intent and values of the author are, and can make a case for a reweighing of those priorities. This isn’t a question of limiting the critic, but merely one of appropriateness. To totally ignore the purpose of the author is to misunderstand the work, and hence you cannot possibly present a valid interpretation (the explanation of your understanding). A critic must found their argument on valid interpretation.